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OPINION 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Vincent A. Colianni appeals from the magistrate judge’s 
order finding that he violated ABA Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct Rule 3.5 by initiating post-verdict contact with a juror.  For 
the reasons explained below, we hold that the judge abused his 
discretion in reaching that conclusion and sanctioning Colianni for 
his conduct.  We further find that the judge denied Colianni’s due 
process rights by not following the disciplinary procedures outlined 
in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of the Virgin Islands and 
by failing to give Colianni sufficient notice and an opportunity to be 
heard prior to finding misconduct and imposing sanctions.  
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
  Appellant Yolanda Adams filed suit in the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands after she suffered a serious brain injury while 
driving a vehicle manufactured by Ford Motor Company.  By 
consent of the parties, Magistrate Judge George W. Cannon presided 
over the trial in the district court.  The jury awarded Adams $2.3 
million in damages, and determined that she was 77.5% at fault and 
that Ford was 22.5% at fault.   
 
 Vincent Colianni, Adam’s counsel of record, called one of the 
jurors shortly after the trial ended to ask about the jury’s award of 
damages and the assignment of fault between the parties.  Colianni 
apparently believed that there had been a clerical error on the verdict 
form.  After not being able to reach the jury foreperson,  Colianni 
called another juror, Alicia Barnes.  Barnes asked Colianni whether 
it was appropriate for her to speak with him, and Colianni replied 
that it was permissible. Colianni then explained the law of 
contributory negligence in the Virgin Islands, and mistakenly told 
Barnes that the court could apply the negligence standard for 
contributory fault as opposed to strict liability.  After briefly 
speaking with Colianni, Barnes told him that she felt uncomfortable 
discussing the case with him and the call ended.  The conversation 
was very brief, lasting only about one minute.  Three of Colianni’s 
colleagues were in his office with him and heard the entire 
conversation, which Colianni had placed on the speakerphone.    
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 Shortly after the call ended, Barnes contacted Magistrate 
Judge Cannon and informed him that she felt the call was 
inappropriate.  The judge responded by asking Barnes to put her 
complaint in writing.  A few days later, the judge received a letter 
from Barnes in which she related the circumstances of the call and 
stated that she found Colianni’s conduct “reprehensible,” and 
“bordering on harassment.”  (App. 60).  She also stated that 
Colianni’s call was “the reason many are leery of serving as jurors in 
our small community.”  (App. 60).   
 
 Thereafter, Magistrate Judge Cannon contacted counsel for 
both parties and set the matter for an immediate hearing the next 
day.  At the hearing, the judge began by reading the juror’s letter and 
the text of ABA Model Rule 3.5 into the record.  The judge then 
instructed Colianni to recount his version of the telephone call and to 
explain why he had reached out to the juror.  Colianni responded that 
he wished to ask the juror about how his client’s damages had been 
calculated.  Colianni further explained that he had informed the juror 
that she was under no obligation to speak with him, that it was not 
until he had already made his inquiries regarding the jury’s award 
that the juror expressed her discomfort, and that he had immediately 
ended the call once the juror said that she was uncomfortable.  
Colianni acknowledged that he had mistakenly given the juror 
incorrect information about the contributory negligence standard that 
applied in this case. 
 
 Both parties submitted memoranda after the hearing.  On May 
27, 2008, the magistrate judge issued an order in which he found that 
Colianni had “engaged in misconduct by his post-verdict 
communication with a juror in contravention of American Bar 
Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5(c).”  (App. 3).  
The court stated that it would not disbar, suspend, or reprimand 
counsel pursuant to Local Rule 83.2(b)(3) or initiate disciplinary 
proceedings pursuant to Local Rule 83.2(b)(5).  Instead, the 
magistrate judge referred the matter to the Virgin Islands Bar 
Association for a “formal investigation and disciplinary 
proceedings.”  (App. 4).  At a subsequent hearing, the judge denied 
Colianni’s request to seal the order.   
 
 Thereafter, Colianni filed a notice of appeal to this court, but 
we subsequently issued an opinion “reluctantly conclud[ing]” that 
we lacked jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s order because 
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Colianni’s appeal had been filed prior to the entry of final judgment.  
(App. 80).  Colianni subsequently filed this timely notice of appeal.
1
   
 
II.  Standard of Review and Jurisdiction 
 
 The decision to impose sanctions is a matter generally 
entrusted to the discretion of the district court.   Bowers v. The Nat’l 
Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, 
we review a decision to impose sanctions for abuse of discretion.  Id. 
(citing Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 
1995).  Although this standard of review is deferential, a court 
abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it “base[s] its ruling 
on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence.”  Id.; see also Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990).  When the procedure the 
court uses to impose sanctions raises due process issues of fair notice 
and the right to be heard, the standard of review is plenary.  Martin 
v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 
 Adams originally filed this suit in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands, which had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 because the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 
and the parties are completely diverse.   We therefore have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 
III. Discussion 
A.  Standing 
 
 The government first contends that Colianni has no standing 
to appeal because he did not suffer an imminent injury that can be 
redressed by a favorable appellate decision. Specifically, the 
government argues that Colianni does not have a cognizable injury 
because the challenged order did not formally “sanction” or 
reprimand him. 
 
                                              
1
 We directed the United States Attorney for the District of Puerto 
Rico to appear as amicus curiae and to file a brief defending 
Magistrate Judge Cannon’s order because Ford Motor Company no 
longer has a stake in this litigation.  We wish to thank that office for 
the work it did on behalf of the court in representing the challenged 
order.  
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 As in all cases, we must first address the issue of standing 
because “[i]f plaintiffs do not possess Article III standing, both the 
District Court and this Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
address the merits of plaintiff’s case.”  ACLU-NJ v. Township of 
Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).  Standing is the “irreducible constitutional 
minimum” necessary to make a justiciable “case or controversy” 
under Article III, Section 2.   Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  A plaintiff's “interests” satisfy Article III 
when the following three elements are present: 
 
[First], the plaintiff must have 
suffered an injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized, and (b) actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.  [Second], there 
must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the 
conduct complained of—the 
injury has to be fairly traceable to 
the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of 
the independent action of some 
third party not before the court.  
[Third], it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed 
by a favorable decision. 
 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 140 
F.3d 478, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).   
 
 We have previously highlighted the disagreement among the 
courts of appeals about whether a court’s statement in a judicial 
opinion constitutes “a legally sufficient injury to support appellate 
jurisdiction.”   See Bowers, 475 F.3d at 543 (internal citations 
omitted).  Most courts agree that mere judicial criticism of an 
attorney’s conduct is insufficient to constitute a sanction which 
would support standing.  See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 
1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Williams v. United States, 156 F.3d 86, 
90 (1st Cir. 1998); Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th 
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Cir. 1984).   On the other hand, courts nearly uniformly have held 
that an order rising to the level of a public reprimand qualifies as a 
sufficient sanction.  See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 
U.S. 250, 263 (1988); Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138 (equating formal 
finding with public reprimand and sanction); Williams, 156 F.3d at 
92 (“Words alone may suffice [as sanctions] if they are expressly 
identified as a reprimand.”); see also Fed.R. Civ.P. 11(c)(4) 
(providing that sanctions may consist of “nonmonetary directives”).  
Indeed, only the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held 
that a public reprimand is not appealable unless it is accompanied by 
a monetary sanction.  Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mg.. Col, Inc., 
972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e have already decided that 
an attorney may not appeal from an order that finds misconduct but 
does not result in monetary liability, despite the potential 
reputational effects.”).   
 
There is far more disagreement among the courts about 
“whether a factual finding in an opinion that an attorney has engaged 
in improper conduct is itself a sanction, or whether the court must 
enter an explicit order that the conduct is sanctionable.”  Bowers, 
475 F.3d at 543; compare Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United 
States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (fact that reprimand 
was not explicitly contained in separate order was not determinative 
of whether the court had entered a formal reprimand) and Walker v. 
City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1997) (factual finding 
of misconduct alone is sufficient to constitute a sanction) with 
Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a factual finding in an opinion that “merely serves to 
justify the imposition of a sanction is not an independent sanction”).   
 
This case is unlike any that we have previously addressed.  
Magistrate Judge Cannon’s order is more than mere judicial 
criticism because the judge made a factual finding that Colianni had 
violated ABA Model Rule 3.5(c) and the judge then referred the 
matter to the Virgin Islands Bar Association for a formal 
investigation and disciplinary proceedings.  Moreover, the factual 
finding of misconduct was not in an opinion, but in the actual text of 
the order.  On the other hand, the order does not constitute a formal 
reprimand, because the judge explicitly stated that he did not seek to 
“disbar, suspend, or reprimand counsel.”  (App. 3).   
We have never before determined whether a finding of 
attorney misconduct in an order that is unaccompanied by a formal 
reprimand or the imposition of monetary penalties constitutes a 
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“sanction.”  Today, we hold that, under the circumstances here, it 
does.  It is clear that the order directly undermines Colianni’s 
professional reputation and standing in the community.  Bowers, 475 
F.3d at 543.  That is far from an insignificant affront.  “A lawyer’s 
reputation is one of his[/her] most important professional assets.”  
Precision Specialty Metals, 315 F.3d at 1354.
2
  Accordingly, “[t]he 
importance of an attorney’s professional reputation, and the 
imperative to defend it when necessary, obviates the need for a 
finding of monetary liability or other punishment as a requisite for 
the appeal of a court order finding professional misconduct.”  
Walker, 129 F.3d 831; see also Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138 (noting that 
a formal finding of misconduct carries the same consequences as a 
reprimand, as it “is likely to stigmatize [the attorney] among her 
colleagues and potentially could have a serious detrimental effect on 
her career”).  It is all but inevitable that the magistrate judge’s order 
has adversely impacted Coliani’s reputation, particularly in a small 
legal community such as the Virgin Islands.  Moreover, the 
reputational harm that Colianni has suffered is magnified by the 
judge’s refusal to place the order under seal, thus making the order 
accessible to anyone with access to an omnipresent internet 
connection and even minimal familiarity with using an internet 
search engine.     
 
Furthermore, even if we assume that the order is not a 
reprimand, it certainly bears a greater resemblance to a reprimand 
than a comment that is merely critical of  Colianni’s behavior.  “A 
reprimand generally carries with it a degree of formality.”  Talao, 
222 F.3d at 1138.   That prerequisite is clearly satisfied here because 
the assessment of Colianni’s conduct appears in an unsealed court 
                                              
2
 Indeed, there is more than a kernel of truth in Iago’s 
pronouncement in Othello:  
 
“Good name in man and woman . . ., 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls: 
Who steals my purse steals . . . nothing; 
. . . 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which enriches him not 
And makes me poor indeed.”  
 
William Shakespeare, Othello, Act III, Scene II 
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order.
3
  In addition, the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Colianni 
violated ABA Model Rule 3.5 carries consequences that are similar 
to those that flow from a reprimand.  This is particularly true since 
Colianni could face disciplinary action from the Virgin Islands Bar 
Association if the order is affirmed and formal sanctions could be 
imposed.  Therefore, we conclude that Colianni suffered an injury in 
fact, and thus has standing to file this appeal.   
 
B.  Whether the Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding 
that Colianni Engaged in Misconduct 
 
Colianni argues that the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that he engaged in attorney misconduct in violation of ABA 
Model Rule 3.5(c).  He asserts that the magistrate judge’s finding 
was based solely on a letter from a juror, but that neither the judge 
nor the attorneys questioned the juror at the hearing.  In addition, 
Colianni points out that the judge never heard from the three 
witnesses who were in  Colianni’s office during the phone call, nor 
was an evidentiary hearing ever held.  The government counters by 
reminding us that Magistrate Judge Cannon heard a first hand 
account of the conversation between Colianni and the juror just 
minutes after it occurred, and that the juror’s letter was written while 
the juror was still under the emotional impact of the phone call.  
Thus, the government argues the judge could have easily discerned 
any inconsistencies in the letter based on his conversation with the 
juror.    
 
Rule 3.5(c) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
states that a lawyer shall not communicate with a juror or 
prospective juror after discharge of the jury if: 
 
1) the communication is 
prohibited by law or court order; 
2) the juror has made known to 
the lawyer a desire not to 
communicate; or 
                                              
3
 We take no position on whether our conclusion would have 
been different had the order been filed under seal.  We merely 
note that the fact that it was not sealed makes its harmful 
impact all the more obvious. 
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3) the communication involves 
misrepresentation, coercion, 
duress or harassment; 
 
The comment to Model Rule 3.5 explains that “A lawyer may on 
occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after 
the jury has been discharged.  The lawyer may do so unless the 
communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must respect 
the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer.”  ABA Model Rule 
3.5, cmt. 3. 
 
 We have never before addressed the type of conduct that 
constitutes a violation of Model Rule 3.5(c).  Indeed, the few courts 
that have discussed Model Rule 3.5(c) have focused on subsection 
(c)(1), where an attorney has violated a court order by 
communicating with jurors.  See, e.g., Diettrich v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 
168 F.3d 961, 964 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the attorneys’ use of 
post-verdict dialogue with jury to support motions for overturning 
jury verdict was outside the scope of district court’s permission to 
interview jurors informally and “invited the court to open the black 
box that is the jury room.”); Johnson v. Fla., 804 So. 2d 1218, 1225 
(Fla. 2001)(finding that attorney’s attempt to interview jurors was a 
“fishing expedition.”).   
 
Here, the magistrate judge did not specify either at the 
hearing or in the order which subsection of the Model Rule he 
believed Colianni violated.  However,  it is clear that Colianni did 
not violate Model Rule 3.5(c)(1), which bars communication with 
jurors when prohibited by law or a court order.  Nothing in the 
record suggests that the judge forbade Colianni or his opposing 
counsel from contacting jurors after the verdict, nor do the local 
rules of the District Court of the Virgin Islands prohibit attorneys 
from contacting jurors post-verdict.    
 
Similarly, it does not appear that Colianni violated Model 
Rule 3.5(c)(2), which prohibits attorneys from contacting jurors who 
have made clear their desire not to communicate.  The juror initially 
asked Colianni whether she was permitted to speak with him.  Once 
Colianni informed her that she could, she willingly conversed with 
him, albeit only briefly before expressing her discomfort.  As noted 
earlier, Colianni ended the call as soon as the juror expressed that 
she was uncomfortable speaking with him. 
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Thus, the only remaining possibility is that the judge believed 
that Colianni had harassed the juror in violation of Model Rule 
3.5(c)(3).  There are no cases within our jurisdiction defining what 
constitutes “harassment” under Model Rule 3.5, nor do the 
comments to the Rule assist our inquiry here.  In such instances, we 
normally look to standard reference works such as legal and general 
dictionaries in order to determine the ordinary meaning of words.  
United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing 
Appalachian States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Comm’n v. Pena, 
126 F.3d 193, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Black’s Dictionary defines 
harassment as “words, conduct, or action (usu. repeated or 
persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, 
or causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no 
legitimate purpose.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 784  (9th ed. 2009).  
However, it is inconceivable that Colianni’s conduct constituted 
“harassment” under Model Rule 3.5(c)(3) under any reasonable 
interpretation of that term.  His actions were not repeated, as he only 
called the juror once and the entire conversation lasted less than one 
minute.  In addition, Colianni called the juror with a legitimate 
purpose, which was to understand how the jury had calculated 
damages.  As soon as the juror expressed that she did not wish to 
speak with him, he ended the conversation.  This cannot possibly 
constitute harassment and the record does not support a conclusion 
that Colianni’s conduct violated any other provision of the Model 
Rule.  Because the court “based its ruling [to the contrary]. . . on a 
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” Bowers, 475 F.3d at 
538, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in finding that 
Colianni engaged in misconduct. 
 
C.  Whether the Court Denied Colianni His Procedural 
Due Process Rights Under Virgin Islands Local Rule 83.2 
 
Colianni further contends that the court violated his 
procedural due process rights by failing to follow the disciplinary 
procedures as set forth in Local Rule 83.2(b) of the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands.  The rule provides that “when misconduct or 
allegations of misconduct . . . would warrant discipline of an 
attorney admitted to practice before the court shall come to the 
attention of a judge of this court. . . the Chief Judge . . . shall refer 
the matter to the clerk of court, who shall refer it to counsel for 
investigation and the prosecution of a formal disciplinary 
proceeding.”  The rule also states that an order following a 
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disciplinary proceeding “shall be placed under seal until further 
order of the court.”   
 
The government insists that the magistrate judge was not 
required to follow Local Rule 83.2(b) because the rule applies only 
to the imposition of sanctions.  That argument is of little moment, 
however, because as we have already explained, the magistrate 
judge’s order was equivalent to a sanction.   Accordingly, the 
magistrate judge should have referred the allegations of misconduct 
to the Chief Judge for investigation and sealed the order; it did 
neither.  We will therefore vacate the magistrate judge’s order for 
failing to follow the local rules.  See In re Abrams, 521 F.2d 1094, 
1107 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing sanctions order for failing to follow 
local rule specifying disciplinary procedures).   
 
D.  Whether the Court Violated Colianni’s Due Process 
Rights by Failing to Give Notice of Possible Sanctions 
 
Finally, Colianni argues that the magistrate judge violated his 
due process rights by failing to provide him with notice that 
sanctions might be imposed.  Colianni asserts that at the meeting that 
the magistrate judge convened to discuss the juror’s letter, the judge 
never mentioned that he could potentially be subject to sanctions.  
After the meeting, the judge entered an order to schedule a “Hearing 
on Juror’s Note.”  The May 9, 2008 order made no mention of 
potential sanctions against Colianni either.  Colianni points out that 
during the hearing on May 13, 2008, the judge expressed that he was 
not happy that the juror had been contacted, but the judge never 
informed Colianni that he could be subject to disciplinary 
proceedings.  Colianni asserts that the first time he realized that he 
was being sanctioned is when he received the magistrate judge’s 
order on May 27, 2008 finding that he engaged in misconduct in 
violation of ABA Model Rule 3.5(c). 
 
The government claims that Colianni was placed on notice 
that his communication with the juror was improper when the judge 
instructed counsel not to have any further contact with the jurors and 
immediately set the matter for a hearing.   The government also 
points out that Colianni made specific reference to the language in 
Model Rule 3.5(c) at least twice during the hearing as well as in the 
memorandum that he submitted to the court after the hearing.  Thus, 
the government insists, the magistrate judge gave Colianni sufficient 
notice that he had potentially violated Model Rule 3.5(c). 
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“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires a 
federal court to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard before 
sanctions are imposed on a litigant or attorney.”  Martin v. Brown, 
63 F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995).  We have previously held that 
“particularized notice is required to comport with due process” prior 
to sanctioning an attorney.  Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. 
v. Charter Tech., Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1225 (3d Cir. 1995).  
“Generally speaking, particularized notice will usually require notice 
of the precise sanctioning tool that the court intends to employ.”  Id.  
An opportunity to be heard is “especially important” where a lawyer 
or firm’s reputation is at stake because sanctions “act as a symbolic 
statement about the quality and integrity of an attorney’s work—a 
statement which may have a tangible effect upon the attorneys’ 
career. “  Id. at 1227.  As noted above when we referenced the 
availability of the internet, modern search engines and web sites 
oriented toward allowing consumers to voice displeasure about 
experiences they have had exponentially increase the impact of such 
sanctions on a professional’s reputation and career.  Moreover, such 
complaints are not unlike a cybernetic zombie that lives on in 
cyberspace long after any underlying dispute has been resolved - 
even if it is resolved to the ultimate satisfaction of the consumer (or 
client).   See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer 
Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 
1393, 1412 (2001) (explaining that once information appears on the 
internet, it is impossible to erase it entirely because it creates “a 
permanent record of unparalleled pervasiveness and depth . . . almost 
everything on the Internet is being archived. . . little on the Internet 
disappears or is forgotten, even when we delete or change the 
information.”). 
 
Here, it is evident that Colianni had no notice, much less 
“particularized notice,” Charter Tech., Inc., 57 F.3d at 1225, about 
the potential sanctions he faced prior to the judge’s order finding that 
he engaged in misconduct.  A review of the hearing transcript makes 
clear that the judge never even hinted that Colianni would be subject 
to sanctions.  In addition, the fact that Colianni came to the hearing 
representing himself, as opposed to obtaining an attorney, is 
consistent with his claim that he did not realize the gravity of the 
circumstances and had no reason to believe that he might be subject 
to disciplinary proceedings.   
 
In addition to the lack of notice, we find that Colianni did not 
have sufficient opportunity to be heard.   Since the judge did not 
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hold an evidentiary hearing, Colianni was not given the chance to 
present any witnesses to testify on his behalf.  For example, Colianni 
could have called the three witnesses who were in his office during 
the phone call to testify about the conversation with the juror.  
Moreover, the judge did not question the juror who complained 
about his conduct.
4
  Accordingly, we find that the district court 
violated Colianni’s due process rights by failing to provide him with 
sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district court’s 
order.
                                              
4
 Colianni also argues that due process requires that he should 
have been able to question the complaining juror during a 
hearing.  However, given the circumstances here, we need not 
determine if due process extends that far.   In an appropriate 
case, a court can make that determination based upon all the 
circumstances before it, including the risk of invading the 
deliberative process of jury deliberations and any possible 
chilling effect such a procedure could have on jurors serving 
on a jury again. 
